Resolvendo o problema cético

  • Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo UFSC/UFOP

Resumo

Muitos dos mais celebrados, intrigantes e poderosos argumentos céticos procedem por meio de hipóteses céticas. Reduzidos ao seu essencial, grosso modo, eles possuem a seguinte forma, onde “O” é uma proposição sobre o mundo externo que alguém comumente pensaria que sabe (e.g., tenho mãos1) e “H” é uma hipótese cética convenientemente escolhida (e.g. sou um cérebro sem corpo numa cuba que foi eletro-quimicamente estimulado para ter precisamente as experiências sensoriais que tive, doravante um BIV2):

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Publicado
2017-04-01