A Crítica de Schlick ao conhecimento sintético a priori de Kant

Abstract

This article examines Kant’s concept of synthetic a priori judgments and Moritz Schlick’s criticisms from a logical-positivist perspective. For Kant, such judgments expand knowledge with universality and necessity, grounding mathematics, geometry, physics, and the very possibility of metaphysics as a science. They arise from pure forms of sensibility (space and time) and from categories of the understanding, such as causality. Schlick challenges this view by arguing that: (i) geometry depends on axioms and conventions and is reshaped by non-Euclidean systems and relativity; (ii) arithmetic is analytic, based on definitions and rules rather than temporal intuitions; and (iii) causality is an empirical hypothesis, not an a priori category. He concludes that synthetic a priori judgments do not exist, and thus metaphysics cannot claim scientific status.