Weitz and the Open Concept Argument

A response to Carroll’s charge of fallacy

Abstract

The first aim of this article is to reconstruct Morris Weitz’s open concept argument in defense of the thesis that the concept of art cannot be defined. The interpretation proposed here has two important consequences: (a) Weitz is not actually committed to the controversial claim, sometimes attributed to him, that only open concepts are compatible with manifestations of creativity; and (b) the open concept argument does not presuppose the family resemblance model, so that objections to the latter, even if correct, do not refute the former. The second aim of the article is to respond to the objection raised by Noël Carroll that the open concept argument constitutes an instance of the fallacy of equivocation. We argue that Carroll’s criticism relies on a possible but implausible reconstruction of Morris Weitz’s proposal. On the one hand, Carroll introduces at least two unnecessary premises into Weitz’s argument. Removing these premises would not only avoid the alleged fallacy but would also yield a reading that is more faithful to Weitz’s text. On the other hand, the reconstruction of the open concept argument proposed here is more charitable than Carroll’s, and also more faithful to Weitz’s argumentative strategy. We conclude that there are no good reasons to accept that the open concept argument is a case of the fallacy of equivocation.