Angústia, Possibilidade e Liberdade: Um estudo kierkegaardiano através da obra “O Idiota” de Dostoiévski

Abstract

This article investigates a development within the concept of angst introduced by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard through its articulation with a narrative described in The Idiot, by Fyodor Dostoevsky. Starting from the understanding that angst does not depend on concrete realizations, the analysis focuses on the account of a condemned man facing execution, in which an extreme configuration becomes evident: even in the face of the inexorability of death, the individual’s consciousness persists in projecting situations that are not linked to any effective horizon of realization. Such narrative allows for the exploration of a form of experience in which openness to possibility is not annulled, but is almost entirely restricted in terms of the capacity for action. In this way, the duality imposed by the narrated context indicates the need to rethink the Kierkegaardian concept of angst and its developments at the limits of its formulation, especially in contexts in which freedom is radically constrained.

Keywords: angst; Dostoevsky; possibility; freedom; consciousness.