IA, para quê te quero?

Sabrina Aragão

doi:10.5281/zenodo.21269749

Sabrina Aragão UECE

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21269749

Keywords: moral agency, artificial intelligence, ethics

Abstract

This article investigates the possibility of attributing moral agency to Artificial Intelligence (AI). The first section discusses the possibility of AI agency and, if it exists, the nature of that agency. The second section analyzes the challenges of assigning responsibility regarding autonomous and opaque systems. The third section brings the proposals of David Gunkel and Mark Coeckelbergh into dialogue. The former advocates for "moral patience," shifting the focus from the capacity to act to the possibility of being affected. The latter develops a socio-relational approach, in which moral status is attributed based on the relationships established with AIs. The article concludes that Coeckelbergh’s approach is more promising for considering ethical responsibility regarding AI, as responsibility requires transparency and responsiveness.

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AI, what are you good for?

On agency and responsibility in the age of technology

Abstract

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